CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, GOOD AND BAD: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

John Duffy, Nick Feltovich

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00598.x

CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, GOOD AND BAD: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

DOI Web Site Web Site 被引用文献1件

書誌事項

公開日: 2010-08

権利情報

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor

DOI

10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00598.x

公開者: Wiley

この論文をさがす

CiNii Books

説明

<jats:p>We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of <jats:italic>correlated equilibrium</jats:italic>, an important generalization of Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private third‐party recommendations drawn from publicly announced distributions. We find that when recommendations are given, behavior differs from both a mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium and behavior without recommendations. In particular, subjects typically follow recommendations if and only if (1) those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium and (2) that correlated equilibrium is payoff‐enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.</jats:p>