Potential rationality in collective decision-making

Susumu Cato

doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04365-2

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This study investigates Suzumura consistency as a condition for the rationality of social preferences. A preference is said to be Suzumura-consistent when all preference cycles include only indifference relations. This condition is equivalent to transitivity in the presence of completeness, but, in general, it is substantially weaker than transitivity when preference is incomplete. Notably, Suzumura consistency is especially significant for a preference because it is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an ordering (transitive and complete preference) that is compatible with the original preference. This coherency property can be regarded as a requirement for potential rationality. In this study, we examine the implications of shifting from actual rationality to potential rationality in collective decision-making. We introduce the concept of an alternative-dependent coherent collection in order to obtain a representation of a class of Suzumura-consistent collective choice rules that satisfy the axioms imposed in Arrow’s impossibility theorem. This demonstrates that the power structure to determine social choice can be alternative-dependent.</jats:p>

Potential rationality in collective decision-making

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