Replicator Dynamics of Evolutionary Hypergames

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説明

In evolutionary game theory, the distribution of strategies in the population is changed according to payoffs which individuals earn depending on their selected strategies. However, to the best of our knowledge, individuals' perceptions in evolutionary games have been disregarded. Individuals that select a strategy by trial and error may perceive the same conflict situation from different viewpoints. Hence, the influence of individuals' perceptions has to be taken into consideration. In this correspondence, interpretation functions in hypergames are introduced into evolutionary games. Using them, we formulate replicator dynamics considering individuals' perceptions. In a special case that there exist two populations, we show that its interior equilibrium point is stable if the corresponding point is a hyper-Nash-Pareto pair

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