書誌事項
- 公開日
- 2005-05
- 権利情報
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- https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms
- DOI
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- 10.1017/s0003055405051609
- 公開者
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
この論文をさがす
説明
<jats:p>This paper characterizes behavior with “noisy” decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a “quantal response” equilibrium, and the resulting predictions are compared with Nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise. Many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner.</jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- American Political Science Review
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American Political Science Review 99 (2), 201-213, 2005-05
Cambridge University Press (CUP)