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- Randall Morck
- University of Alberta Edmonton
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- Masao Nakamura
- University of British Columbia Vancouver
書誌事項
- 公開日
- 1999-02
- 権利情報
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- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor
- DOI
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- 10.1111/0022-1082.00106
- 公開者
- Wiley
この論文をさがす
説明
<jats:p>Using a large sample of Japanese firm level data, we find that Japanese banks act primarily in the short term interests of creditors when dealing with firms outside bank groups. Corporate control mechanisms other than bank oversight appear necessary in these firms. When dealing with firms in bank groups, banks may act in the broader interests of a range of stakeholders, including shareholders. However, our findings are also consistent with banks “propping up” troubled bank group firms. We conclude that bank oversight need not lead to value maximizing corporate governance.</jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- The Journal of Finance
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The Journal of Finance 54 (1), 319-339, 1999-02
Wiley