Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities

Hiroo Sasaki, Manabu Toda

doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0077

Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities

DOI Web Site Web Site 被引用文献5件

書誌事項

公開日: 1996-07

権利情報

https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/

DOI

10.1006/jeth.1996.0077

公開者: Elsevier BV

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説明

Abstract In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C78, D62.