-
- Dilip Mookherjee
- Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215.
-
- Debraj Ray
- Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10003.
この論文をさがす
説明
<jats:p> Can historical wealth distributions affect long-run output and inequality despite “rational” saving, convex technology and no externalities? We consider a model of equilibrium short-period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability. If agents have no bargaining power, poor agents have no incentive to save: poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes, with no interclass mobility. If instead agents have all the bargaining power, strong saving incentives are generated: the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and “history” does not matter eventually. </jats:p>
収録刊行物
-
- American Economic Review
-
American Economic Review 92 (4), 818-849, 2002-08-01
American Economic Association