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- Alvaro Sandroni
- Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3708 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 and Kellogg School of Management, MEDS Department, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60208.
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- Francesco Squintani
- Università degli Studi di Brescia, Via S. Faustino, 74/B, 25122 Brescia, Italy, Essex University, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK, ELSE, University College London, Drayton House, Gordon Street, London WC1H OAN, UK.
書誌事項
- 公開日
- 2007-12-01
- DOI
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- 10.1257/aer.97.5.1994
- 公開者
- American Economic Association
この論文をさがす
説明
<jats:p> It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets. We find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks, compulsory insurance makes low-risk agents worse off. Hence, behavioral biases may weaken some of the well-established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information. (JEL D82, G22) </jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- American Economic Review
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American Economic Review 97 (5), 1994-2004, 2007-12-01
American Economic Association