Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda
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- Erika Deserranno
- Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208 (email: )
書誌事項
- 公開日
- 2019-01-01
- DOI
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- 10.1257/app.20170670
- 公開者
- American Economic Association
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説明
<jats:p> I study the role of financial incentives as signals of job characteristics when these are unknown to potential applicants. To this end, I create experimental variation in expected earnings and use that to estimate the effect of financial incentives on candidates’ perception of a brand-new health-promoter position in Uganda and on the resulting size and composition of the applicant pool. I find that more lucrative positions are perceived as entailing a lower positive externality for the community and discourage agents with strong pro-social preferences from applying. While higher financial incentives attract more applicants and increase the probability of filling a vacancy, the signal they convey reduces the ability to recruit the most socially motivated agents, who are found to stay longer on the job and to perform better. (JEL D82, I18, J31, J63, M52, O15) </jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
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American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11 (1), 277-317, 2019-01-01
American Economic Association
