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- Aytek Erdil
- University of Oxford, Department of Economics and Nuffield College, New Road, OX1 1NF, UK.
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- Haluk Ergin
- Washington University in Saint Louis, Department of Economics, Campus Box 1208, 1 Brookings Drive, Saint Louis, MO 63130.
説明
<jats:p> In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak. The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a stable improvement cycle. We also investigate the strategic properties of the student-optimal stable mechanism. (JEL C78, D82, I21) </jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- American Economic Review
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American Economic Review 98 (3), 669-689, 2008-05-01
American Economic Association
