Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered

DOI DOI DOI Web Site 3 Citations
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
    Department of Economics, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708.
  • Yeon-Koo Che
    Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, and YERI, Yonsei University.
  • Yosuke Yasuda
    National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan.

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<jats:p> Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare, that it may not harm but rather benefit participants who may not strategize well, and that, in the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism also tends to facilitate greater access than the DA to good schools for those lacking priorities at those schools. (JEL D82, I21, I28) </jats:p>

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