IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS ON MUTUAL EVALUATION
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- Ando Kazutoshi
- Shizuoka University
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- Ohara Akari
- University of Tsukuba
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- Yamamoto Yoshitsugu
- University of Tsukuba
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 相互評価の下での不可能性定理
- ソウゴ ヒョウカ ノ シタ デ ノ フカノウセイ テイリ
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Abstract
Arrow's impossibility theorem, which is a classical result in social choice theory, shows that it is impossible to design a democratic rule for social decision making that obeys some reasonable criteria. In the Arrow's model, each individual of a society has a preference order among given alternatives and the society needs to agree on a preference order that aggregates individuals' preference orders. In this paper, we consider a model where each individual has a preference order on all the individuals but herself/himself. We introduce some reasonable criteria of an aggregation rule for this mutual evaluation model, investigate several combinations of these criteria, and show that each of these combinations leads to a negative consequence.
Journal
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- Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan
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Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan 46 (4), 523-533, 2003
The Operations Research Society of Japan
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390001204110843264
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- NII Article ID
- 110001183587
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- NII Book ID
- AA00703935
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- ISSN
- 21888299
- 04534514
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- NDL BIB ID
- 6789018
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- NDL
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed