社会的なものの論理

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タイトル別名
  • The Logic of “the Social” in Parsons' Theory
  • シャカイテキ ナ モノ ノ ロンリ T パーソンズ ノ バアイ
  • T・パーソンズのばあい

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抄録

Contempory discussions of Parsons' theory have stumbled because they are unsuccessful in understanding his theory in terms of the synthesis of his epistemological logic, his analytical model and his substantive problems. In this paper I attempt to explore the logic of “the so-called social” in his theory, by means of an examination of the theorem of institutional integration. This theorem involves his basic ideas of “the social” and in premised on what he calls “principle of duality”. This principle is concerned with the relation of actor and social object. It is derived from analytical realism as his epistemological position and his action frame of reference.<BR>The main theme of this theorem, of course, works out a solution to “the Hobbesian problem of order”. Such sufficient solution of problem of order needs to articulate basic presuppositions of this theorem. According to my opinion, these presuppositions are, above all, voluntaristic images, of man, the theory of pluralistic structures of society and values of individualism. Particularly, this individualism is the core of his.basic ideas of “the social”. Parsons' theory.asserts that societies achieve true social integration in proportion to the degree of institutionalization of individualism. Such social integration can be realized only by changing preexisting structures so as to level up the degree of individualism.<BR>Real social integration and actual social change, however, occurs within and is influenced by constraining structures. Parsons have only insufficiently grasped such constraining factors in economic and political spheres.<BR>Nevertheless, his ideas of the dynamic relation of individual freedom and social order, in other words, the social basis of individual freedom represent a major contribution to the understanding of the logic of “the social” in Modern sociological theory.

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