書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- The Economics of the Quake-Data Falsification Scandal
- 耐震強度偽造問題の経済分析
- タイシン キョウド ギゾウ モンダイ ノ ケイザイ ブンセキ
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説明
We examined what kind of system is necessary to solve the problems caused by asymmetric information between consumers and builders of condominiums. Under the hidden information that the house builders and designers take an action unobserved by the consumers, they have an incentive to produce the buildings of lower quality such as less performance on earthquake-proof.<BR>We propose to introduce the building quality registration system which provides for important information about whether the authorized inspectors for buildings have checked the involved building and about the flexible premium applied by the insurance company.The higher premium implies the higher risk of falsification about the quake-data and the builder's hidden action of making the less quality products.<BR>The registration system enables consumers to know the quality of the involved building. The flexible premium rate of insurance can protect more efficiently the consumers from flaws of the buildings than the fixed premium that causes a serious moral hazard.
収録刊行物
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- 日本不動産学会誌
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日本不動産学会誌 19 (4), 16-23, 2006
Japan Association for Real Estate Sciences
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390001204321237120
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- NII論文ID
- 130001764705
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- NII書誌ID
- AN10028750
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- ISSN
- 21859531
- 09113576
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- NDL書誌ID
- 7951774
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
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