A Rigorous Security Proof for the Enhanced Version of Password-Protected Secret Sharing Scheme
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- HASEGAWA Shingo
- Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University
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- ISOBE Shuji
- Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University
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- IWAZAKI Jun-ya
- Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University Presently, Graduate School of Medicine, Tohoku University
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- KOIZUMI Eisuke
- Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University
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- SHIZUYA Hiroki
- Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University
Abstract
The password-protected secret sharing (PPSS, for short) and its security notion, called in this paper the PPSS-security, were proposed by Bagherzandi, Jarecki, Saxena and Lu. However, another security notion for PPSS schemes, the pparam-security was proposed by Hasegawa, Isobe, Iwazaki, Koizumi and Shizuya, because they pointed out an attack which can break the original protocol proposed by Bagherzandi et al. Hasegawa et al. also showed how to enhance the protocol, and proved that the enhanced one is pparam-secure. In this paper, we prove that the enhanced one is PPSS-secure as well.
Journal
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- Interdisciplinary Information Sciences
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Interdisciplinary Information Sciences 22 (1), 31-55, 2016
The Editorial Committee of the Interdisciplinary Information Sciences
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Keywords
Details
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- CRID
- 1390001204437989120
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- NII Article ID
- 130005281206
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- ISSN
- 13476157
- 13409050
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- Text Lang
- en
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- IRDB
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed