VCG-equivalent in Expectation Mechanism
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- FUJITA Etsushi
- Graduate School of ISEE, Kyushu University
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- IWASAKI Atsushi
- Graduate School of Information Systems, University of Electro-Communications
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- TODO Taiki
- Graduate School of ISEE, Kyushu University
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- YOKOO Makoto
- Graduate School of ISEE, Kyushu University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- VCG-equivalent in Expectationメカニズム
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. To guarantee that sincere strategies are an ex post equilibrium, it inevitably asks an irrelevant query, in which a participant has no incentive to answer the query sincerely. Such an irrelevant query causes unnecessary leakage of private information and a different incentive issue. In a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, the mechanism achieves the same allocation as VCG, but the transfers are the same as VCG only in expectation. We show that in a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, sincere strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. Also, we develop a general procedure for constructing a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that does not ask any irrelevant query. To demonstrate the applicability of this idea in a practical application, we develop a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that can be applied to the Japanese 4G spectrum auction.
Journal
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- Computer Software
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Computer Software 31 (3), 3_156-3_167, 2014
Japan Society for Software Science and Technology
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Details
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- CRID
- 1390001204738487296
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- NII Article ID
- 130004688275
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- ISSN
- 02896540
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed