What does the ‘Transparency of Experience’ Show about the Relationship between the Phenomenality and the Intentionality of Experience?

Ogusa Yasushi

doi:10.4216/jpssj.44.1_17

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

「経験の透明性」は経験の現象性と志向性の関係について何を示しているのか

Abstract

A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.

Journal

Kagaku tetsugaku

Kagaku tetsugaku 44 (1), 17-33, 2011

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

Details 詳細情報について

CRID: 1390001205083828608

NII Article ID: 130004546720

DOI: 10.4216/jpssj.44.1_17

ISSN: 18836461; 02893428

Text Lang: en

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Abstract License Flag: Disallowed

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