Defending the Anti-casual Theory of Action Based on the Anti-psychologism of Reason

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Other Title
  • 理由の反心理主義に基づいて行為の反因果説を擁護する
  • リユウ ノ ハン シンリ シュギ ニ モトズイテ コウイ ノ ハン インガセツ オ ヨウゴ スル

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Abstract

<p>    The causal theory of action, which has been the standard theory of action, presupposes that reasons for action are an agentʼs mental attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) and claims that they are the cause of the action. However, in this paper I argue that reasons for action are not the agentʼs mental attitudes but their object (e.g. facts, states of affairs, or propositions), inspired by the idea that reasons must be capable of justifying the action as well as explaining it, and that what has this normative force is not mental items, but something objective. I also solve a problem that derives from cases in which the agent believes things falsely.</p>

Journal

  • Kagaku tetsugaku

    Kagaku tetsugaku 49 (1), 1-17, 2016

    The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

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