Can Evolutionary Game Theory Evolve in Sociology?: Beyond Solving the Prisoner's Dilemma
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- SATO Yoshimichi
- Graduate School of Arts and Letters<BR>Tohoku University
書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- Can Evolutionary Game Theory Evolve in Sociology? :
- Beyond Solving the Prisoner's Dilemma
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抄録
Although evolutionary game theory has been popular in social sciences, we have seldom checked its utility as a tool in sociology. In this paper I argue that evolutionary game theory is a good tool with which we study evolution of certain types of social order, but that it has a limitation when we apply it to the study of evolution of the division of labor. To prove the argument, I first adopt a working definition of social order as a self-enforcing relationship between action and expectation. Then I adopt the fictitious play and best reply assumptions rather than the hardwired strategy and replicator dynamics assumptions, because the former are fitter for analysis of the self-enforcing relationship. Third, I claim that the core of the division of labor is the creation of new roles and build an evolutionary game theoretic framework of evolution of the division of labor. Finally, I point out that a limitation of evolutionary game theory in the study of evolution of the division of labor as social order is that it assumes a finite set of possible actions, while evolution of the division of labor accompanies new actions. This limitation, however, shows us where to attack to make a breakthrough.
収録刊行物
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- 理論と方法
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理論と方法 18 (2), 185-196, 2003
数理社会学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390001205166989568
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- NII論文ID
- 110000511892
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- NII書誌ID
- AN10096921
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- ISSN
- 18816495
- 09131442
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- NDL書誌ID
- 6744521
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- 使用不可