HOW DOES THE REGULATOR CHOOSE ITS ADMINISTRATIVE TOOLS FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION ?
- MURAKAMI Yuichi
- The University of Tokyo, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
- Other Title
- カンミンキョウドウ ノ シュダン センタク ノ ジョウケン トウ ニ ツイテ ノ ブンセキ : デンキ ヨウヒン ノ アンゼン ・ ショウガイ ニ カンスル 2ツ ノ キセイ ノ ヒカク オ トオシテ
- A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF REGULATIONS ON ELECTRIC APPLIANCES
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Complicated forms of 'public-private division of labour' are frequently observed in regulatory activities. In this paper, I first classify the institutional alternatives of public-private work-sharing, according to the amount of discretion that remains with the government. Then, I expand on my research agenda?how the delegated regulator chooses its administrative tools for public-private collaboration, and the performance of such tools?through a comparative case study on  the third-party/self-certification system under the Electrical Appliance and Material Safety Law, and  self-regulation against electromagnetic interference (EMI) managed by a private council, the Voluntary Control Council for Interference by Information Technology Equipment (VCCI). The results reveal that their differences in administrative tools are also explained by differences in  the resources that the industry possesses for effective regulation, such as administrative or punitive powers for appropriate implementation, and so,  suitable discretionary tools in the government for making the regulation productive and responsive in the regulatory space (provided by social factors such as market, consumer, and information), and  whether the regulatory system directly suffered from political tides of the regulatory reform in the 1980s, in addition to differences in  tools reasonable for the nature of the regulated technology, and  the respective path-dependent factor. This paper also mentions some implications for sociotechnology research.
SOCIOTECHNICA 8 124-137, 2011
Sociotechnology Research Network