On the Ethical Traits Demanded of Educators Confronted with Evidence:Intellectual Virtue in Virtue Epistemology

 The main objective of this article is to examine, in the era of Evidence-Based Educational Policy and Practices (EBE), neither what is evidence for educators, nor what researchers contribute to education, but how educators should respond to EBE.<br> It seems that we should pay attention to the motivations and attitudes of educators confronted with EBE. In the conversation between traditional educational research and neuroeducational research, which is representative of EBE, some researchers investigate how educators receive neuroeducational knowledge both quantitatively and qualitatively. This research shows that most educators are motivated to use that knowledge in order to avoid justifying their own practices. As Paul Standish claims, this means that EBE may undermine the professional faculties of educators.<br> Therefore, focusing on the debates on intellectual virtue in virtue epistemology, I suggest that we shed light on the ethical traits of educators confronted with EBE. Virtue epistemology is emerging as one of the approaches to epistemic issues. Virtue epistemology is characterized by a shift in focus from properties of beliefs to the intellectual traits of the agent: from what is required for something to be knowledge to what is required for someone to know better. Although this person-based epistemology would have many implications for education, very few attempts have been made at considering the implications for educators making use of knowledge about education.<br> It is helpful to distinguish two main groups in virtue epistemology: virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism. Both try to resolve the Gettier problem. Gettier demonstrates that the concept of knowledge as justified-true belief is insufficient through scenarios in which, though three criteria for knowledge (justification, truth, belief) seem to be met, most of us would not think the result is knowledge due to epistemic luck.<br> Virtue-reliabilists, by arguing that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming process, add a new condition for knowledge: the knower’s faculty or intellectual virtue characteristic of that process (adequate memory, hearing, reasoning, introspection). However, virtue-reliabilists are in agreement with traditional epistemology when they presume that a main issue of epistemology is to get to the truth. What they characterize as intellectual virtue is, therefore, merely a means for the attainment of the truth.<br> In contrast to the virtue-reliabilists, the virtue-responsibilist Linda Zagzebski emphasizes the character of the knower. In accordance with Aristotle’s ethics, she claims that intellectual virtue is not merely a means but an intrinsic part of knowing successfully. We estimate highly someone who is open-minded, intellectually courageous, impartial and so forth, even if he or she fails at knowing something. This means that the motivation or attitude toward knowing something virtuously is more valuable than getting to the truth.<br> Zagzebski’s argument provides an alternative view on what is required of educators in the era of EBE. It is true that accurate knowledge about education may be involved in effective education. However, the most important question to ask first is what kind of motivation or attitude is required for educators to know better, or to become intellectually virtuous.