F. Bacon pleaded for the practical and technological character of knowledge, saying “knowledge is power”. His originality is rightly said to consist in his sense of the importance of experiment and invention in knowledge. But the significance of his inductive method and natural philosophy for modern science, has not always been rightly evaluated. In this essay, we will explain the equivocality of his inductive method and natural philosophy, and make explicit several characteristics of Bacon's view of nature.<BR>By inductive method, Bacon defines the form of heat, as a motion of the smaller particles of bodies. This idea seems to be similar to the theory of molecular motion in heat, by Descartes, Boyle and Galilei. Bacon, however, has not overcome the renaissance view, that the opposition of heat and cold is interpreted as substantial one. He has not established the theory of relativity of heat and cold.<BR>Bacon regards “form” as “law”. But we can not identify the “form” with the law of natural science. We find in it some influences of alchemic ideas. Alchemy is formed on the ground of Aristotelian qualitative logic, and it differs very much from atomism. Atomism reduces inner qualitative and perceptive differences to mathematical, spacial and quantitative differences, and thus atomism can be the conceptual scheme for the world-view of modern natural science. Bacon's theory of “form” is a little alchemic and qualitative, and can not be the scheme theory of natural science.<BR>The arguments by which he arrives at the specification of the form of heat are not inductive, but hypothetical and analytical. But this idea of “form” cannot be identified with “hypothese” of modern science. Form is “true difference or nature engendering nature, or source of emanation”. Form is “formatio”, and inner and qualifying principle of thing's motion. But “law” of natural science is not only inner principle but a external and relational principle of things.<BR>Bacon anticipates “natural philosophy”, which, to Bacon, seemed to be derived by inductive method. His natural philosophy stands between atomism and continuum theory, mechanistic theory and organic theory. He was never a orthodox atomist. In “Novum Organum” and “Historia densi et rari” he seems to inclining to a continuum theory in which the most fundamental qualities are those of density and rarity. Neverthless, in his general conclusion, there is some tendency in favor of some kind of mechanism or pythagorean atomism.<BR>His method of natural philosophy seems to be “analogy”. He made “induction” perfect, founding it on the firm base of natural philosophy. Bacon, the empiricist, on this point stands in a series of modern metaphysicians, such as Descartes, Leibniz. Above all in criticizing atomism and the like, some connections are seen between Bacon's discussion and that of Leibniz. Modern philosopher, Whitehead established Baconian metaphysics, on which induction was based.