What does the Last Wittgenstein's Continuity Thesis Mean?

YAMADA Keiichi

doi:10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.309

In his last writing, Wittgenstein suggests that the border between empirical propositions and logical or mathematical propositions is continuous (I call this idea the ‘continuity thesis’ in this paper). The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate what brought about this idea and what it means.<br>In the system of language games, just as the basic form of calculation cannot be mistaken insofar as far as it functions as the measure for other calculations, so the basic form of judgment cannot be mistaken since it functions as the measure for other judgments. However the basic forms of our language games are supported by various contingent and natural facts and therefore we cannot preclude the possibility that exceptional states of things which cause mistakes might change into ordinary states, and consequently our present scaffolding would break down. The doubt about Moorean propositions (e. g. ‘Here is a hand’) implies doubt about the background conditions or scaffolding of our ordinary judgments and to refuse these doubts means to refuse doubts about this basic form of judgments. In this respect Moorean propositions possess the logical status of a norm of inquiry which is similar to what mathematical propositions possess.<br>It was the encounter with epistemological skepticism that led to Wittgenstein's continuity thesis. And this thesis shows the contingency of our epistemic norms and implies that the hardness of the epistemic ‘must’ consists in the fact that we must start from this scaffolding when we see this world from within the world.

What does the Last Wittgenstein's Continuity Thesis Mean?

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