国際制度の競争歪曲効果

Despite their outstanding technical capabilities, Japanese firms have recently decreased their international competitiveness in various fields. The purpose of this paper is to examine one factor of this phenomenon, namely the diremption between Japanese firms’ technical capabilities and their international competitiveness, by focusing on the aspect of standardization.<br> The studies in international politics analyzing the correlation between international competitiveness and standardization argue that failure to win international standards harm firms’ competitiveness. However, as the studies in business economics point out, standardization means the disclosure of technical information. Considering the technical imitation by emerging countries’ firms, it is presumable that winning international standards encompasses negative effect. Even though emerging countries’ firms lack the capacities for technical development, the technical imitation by using international standards allows them to produce the same product at lower cost. For developed countries’ firms, this means the deterioration of their competitiveness. In order to avoid this negative effect, they need to ensure their discretion to limit the scope and condition of standardization.<br> However, with the conclusion of the international treaties including Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Agreement on Government Procurement, the discretion of firms was deprived. The core obligation under these treaties is the priority adoption of international standards. This creates concern that the products and systems being inconsistent with international standards can be rejected in domestic and world markets. Because of these treaties, the success and failure of acquiring international standards directly links to firms’ competitive results.<br> At stake is whether or not to exercise the discretion in negotiations at the international standardization organizations, and it depends on their decision-making rules. As the international standardization organizations such as ISO and IEC are made up of national standards bodies of each state, they adopt the one-vote-per-state system. This decision-making rule has the effect of transforming the technical competition among firms into the political battle among states. It means that the political power of each state is much operative than the technical one, and the political power of Japan, namely one vote, is significantly weaker than that of European states voting cooperatively. This is why the state-of-the-art technologies developed by Japanese firms are prone to be rejected as international standards and their international competitiveness are harmed. The international institution for standardization consists of these three layers: the international treaties (upper layer), the decision-making rules of international standardization organizations (middle layer), and international standards (lower layer). This paper concludes that the nature of international institution for standardization is one factor that causes the diremption between Japanese firms’ technical capabilities and their international competitiveness.