This paper argues how the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime and bilateral nuclear cooperation deals such as one between the United States and India, are mutually affecting for changing compliance mechanisms of non-proliferation norms.<br>The multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is formed around the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system, equips relatively weak mechanisms of enforcement and compliance. The regime rests its legitimacy and power of compliance on the universality of norms, which supports the logic of appropriateness, or spontaneous compliance by member states. Therefore, in order to achieve its objective, the non-proliferation regime requires various enforcement measures other than the formal IAEA safeguards mechanism, such as export controls through Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and national implementations of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. Such conventional non-proliferation measures are designed to regulate proliferation on the supply side, to stop the outflow of sensitive materials and technology.<br>Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements of the United States are considered as a measure to provide positive and negative incentives to recipient countries. They provide nuclear cooperation in exchange for recipient's compliance with non-proliferation requirements set by the cooperating country. In this case, compliance of the norms would be mainly maintained by the logic of consequence. The United States had once took this approach following the ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech by President Eisenhower in 1953. However, this approach was failed because of the relative decline of U.S. influence in the international nuclear market and other states' acquisition of technological capabilities in the 1970s. It impelled the United States to promote building a multilateral framework and norms of export restriction, which came to fruition as NSG.<br>Recent U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is a symbolic event of the resurgence of this bilateral measure focusing on the demand-side factors. However, it brought about controversy as this cooperation may give rewards to a country outside the NPT, which could threaten the credibility of ‘Grand Bargain’ committed by both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons ones. It could threaten the logic of appropriateness among non-nuclear weapons states.<br>The introduction of a controversial U.S.-India agreement indicates that the U.S. non-proliferation policy is inclined toward putting emphasis on the logics of consequence and enforcement, which are calculated for individual cases, rather than spontaneous compliance by states based on the logic of appropriateness, which relies on the universality of norms. The rise of bilateral agreements implies that considerations on the individuality of cases, rather than the universality of norms becomes more important as a principle for shaping non-proliferation policy of the United States.