Social Dumping and Trade Policy
Search this article
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of social dumping in cases where firms strategically interact in the output market. Two firms (Northern and Southern) compete in the Northern market. The Southern firm practices social dumping by exploiting its monopsony power in the Southern labor market. Using the Cournot-Ikema curve, I diagrammatically demonstrate that social dumping by the Southern firm is actually beneficial to the Northern firm. However, Northern consumers suffer from social dumping. Imposing social clause tariffs gives a strategic advantage to the Southern firm. At the same time, it may improve Northern social welfare.<br> JEL Classification: F12, F13, J42, L13.
Journal
-
- The International Economy
-
The International Economy 16 (0), 59-77, 2013
The Japan Society of International Economics
- Tweet
Details 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1390001205411300864
-
- NII Article ID
- 130004562639
-
- NII Book ID
- AA12436053
-
- ISSN
- 18844367
- 21866074
-
- NDL BIB ID
- 024929187
-
- Text Lang
- en
-
- Data Source
-
- JaLC
- NDL
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
-
- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed
