不完全情報•労働の準固定性•企業内選抜

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タイトル別名
  • IMPERFECT INFORMATION, QUASI-FIXITY OF LABORS, AND INTERNAL SELECTION
  • 不完全情報・労働の準固定性・企業内選抜
  • フカンゼン ジョウホウ ロウドウ ノ ジュン コ テイセイ キギョウナイ セン

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抄録

This paper explains the quasi-fixed relationship between labors and employers in the economy where the imperfect information about the quality of labors dominates and how the extent of the quasi-fixity of labors to a specific firm is determined. Also the impact of the educational information on the efforts to the "on-the-job filtering" by employers and the possibility of "right man in the right job" in the economy are analysed.<br>In this model there exist two different types of labors and jobs ("good" job and "bad" job), and each labor exercises his higher productivity in the right job. Employers who want to know the correct type of labors utilize not only the educational information but also the "on-the-job monitoring" information. Once an employee has been hired, the employer can gradually draw on more directly obtained information to meter his productivity. This information makes his employee different from the others, and the value of his employee increases as the employer accumulates the gathered information.<br>As an important conclusion I stress that in a certain plausible condition the more the educational information is informative, the more employers make the on-the-job filtering systems informative to the labors carrying out good jobs and the less to the labors carrying out bad jobs. This situation is unhappy especially for the labors who are able and failed in acquiring the advantageous career on education.

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