Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem Based upon the Stochastic Differential Utility

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 確率微分効用理論に基づく動学的プリンシパル-エージェント問題

Description

We study the dynamic principal-agent problem based upon the stochastic differential utility. In this paper we assume that the principal and agent make decisions based upon each stochastic differential utility. We apply the stochastic maximum principle togive necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal contracts, for both the symmetricinformation case and the hidden information case. We elucidate that the optimal contract, optimal consumption of the principal, optimal control for the output state variable by the agent are characterized by a certain type of forward-backward stochastic differential equations.

Journal

Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390001205594064512
  • NII Article ID
    130004603540
  • DOI
    10.11345/japannctam.54.0.52.0
  • Data Source
    • JaLC
    • CiNii Articles
  • Abstract License Flag
    Disallowed

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