<p>The contents of this book have long been regarded as a 'theory of propositions', to be naturally placed between the Cat. and the Anal. Pr. -a traditional view originated by the ancient Greek commentators and Boethius, and still presupposed more or less uncritically by most modern scholars. On the other hand, a conventionalism has given currency to 'De Interpretatione' as the title, leaving unsolved the question what 'ερμηνεια' really means; for upon the validity of the definition of 'interpretatio' by Boethius (I.p. 215), though in reality a merely tautological definition, no doubt has been thrown, while the valuable though short and minute suggestion on that point by Waitz (Organon I. pp. 323 sq.) has in fact been neglected. According to the present author our work does not treat of propositions (προτασει&b.sigmav;), of abstract entities, like the Analytics, for the ονομα and ρημα are essentially different from the two οροι that are homogeneous and can easily be represented by alphabetical signs, and we can find nothing of a copula here. Again, instead of a proposition, it is a λογο&b.sigmav;, though of a particular kind, which forms the main subject of our work, and this λογο&b.sigmav; retains such concreteness that it cannot be separated from our ordinary thinking and verbal processes. This way of looking at the λογο&b.sigmav; is precisely shown when it is laid down as an αποφανσι&b.sigmav; (one must think of the phrase 'γνωμην vel δοξαν αποφαινεοθαι'), when it is defined to be a φωνη σηματικη καγα συνθηκην and when 'ο λογο&b.sigmav; λεγων οτι…' is made to correspond strictly to η δαξα η δοξαζονσα οπι…', etc. Besides, 'καγαφασι&b.sigmav;', 'αποφασι&b.sigmav;' and 'αντιφασι&b.sigmav;' ought to be construed with a stress on '-φασι&b.sigmav;'. The peculiar relation of the λογο&b.sigmav; in our work to the πραγμα, or the peculiar extent to which this λογο&b.sigmav; is true, reveals much in this respect, much which is characteristic of the way of thinking and its verbal expression which does not rise above the level of laymen. The relevant points are as follows: (i) The attack against the Megarics in Ch. 9 results substantially in indicating that the power of knowledge corresponding to the αποφανσι&b.sigmav; (though the special αποφανσι&b.sigmav; related to future contingents) can be no επιοτημη since the latter is always true and has only the necessaries for its objects. (ii) Every καγαφασι&b.sigmav; or every αποφαοι&b.sigmav; is is necessarily either true or false and can be neither above nor below that; it is therefore a λογο&b.sigmav; of δοξα or υποληψι&b.sigmav; indeed, but just by being precisely half-true (so to speak), it makes known the πραγμα with the perfection highest possible on this limited and lower epistemological level and with such distinctness as 'either so or not'. (iii) Ch. 11 also, where such an av ripaols plays no role, keeps the same thing in view. The discrimination between the καγα συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav; and the καθ αυτο does not explicitly lead to a higher-order consideration, e.g. that on the nature of the δοξα and iεπιοτημη, but is performed within the lower range of inquiry, i.e. in the form of an inquiry whether or not a given φασι&b.sigmav; can be regarded as having unity. The recondite question is adapted for beginners of philosophy and something of Aristotle's protreptic intention might be concealed here. Such being the character of the whole contents, the title to be given might be expected to run: 'on Elucidation of realities in laymen's language'; and that is the meaning of 'ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ. But some attestation from other sources is required which may confirm that the term ερμηνεια was in use in at least analogically the same</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>