ピュロンにおける事物の無差別性 : Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 14.18.1-4

Concerning Pyrrho's argument in Eusebius' Praeparatio evangelica 14 18 1-4, there have been two main interpretations the so-called metaphysical interpretation (MI) which claims that Pyrrho's scepticism is based on his view that the world is indeterminable by nature, and the epistemological interpretation (EI) which accepts Zeller's "dta to" for "dia touto" and tries to understand Pyrrho's philosophy in light of later Pyrrhonism, to the effect that his statement concerning the world's indeterminability is grounded in the weakness of our cognitive faculties MI has the following weaknesses (1)it cannot give an explanation sufficiently persuasive of the reasoning through which Pyrrho was led to his view of the world's indeterminability, (2) if the world, which seems to have determinate characters when we perceive them, is in fact indeterminable by nature, it seems that Pyrrho should have held that our perceptions are simply false, rather than that they are neither true nor false, (3) Pyrrho's holding the firm belief that the world is indeterminable by nature seems to contradict his declaration that our judgements are neither true nor false and that we should not trust them Even if we accept EI, on the other hand, what can we think of as the ground on which Pyrrho asserted that our perceptions and judgements are neither constant truth-tellers nor constant liars? If it is suggested that he made the assertion on the grounds of actual observation of some perceptions' falsity and others' truthfulness, it turns out that Pyrrho did put his trust in some perceptions at least, despite his recommendation to the contrary My interpretation differs from both in that I suppose Pyrrho's statement about ta pragmata to concern not the world as such but what people take ta pragmata to be in the face of conflicting opinions held by them, Pyrrho judges that people's opinions as to what ta pragmata is are all alike (ep' ises) in that they don't excel as representations of the world (adiaphora) and in that they are unstable (astathmeta), being easily shaken by different circumstances and different persuasions ("Anepikrita" doesn't seem to be used by Pyrrho himself) On this evidence, Pyrrho then examines the reliability of our cognitive faculties as the means through which we try to grasp ta pragmata, and infers that our perceptions and judgements are neither constant truth-tellers nor constant liars The fact that Pyrrho is thus inducing others to share his scepticism supports my view that Pyrrho starts from what people take ta pragmata to be, without any presupposition on his part as to the world's nature It is true that his statement about ta pragmata is in answer to the question "What aie things really like?'" But this is no obstacle to my interpretation, because the question may have been posed not by Pyrrho but by Timon, who has not yet been freed from the traditional idea that knowledge is necessary for happiness, even if Pyrrho brought it up, he may have intended to question the status of what people take ta pragmata to be According to my interpretation, Pyrrho turns out to be totally non-commital at all stages of his argument, and thus best agrees with Timon's testimony in his Silloi that no other mortal could rival Pyrrho, in the midst of the famous philosophers appearing in the Silloi he can avail himself of their conflicting views about the world in order to lead them to the adiaphoria of ta pragmata