プラトンの『国家』における<認識>の位置 : 魂の三区分説への序章

<p>Many scholars have discussed where and how Plato places the cognitive power in the divided or tripartite soul in the Republic. Existing interpretations may fall, on this issue, into two broad groups. On the one hand, some scholars have admitted the cognitive capacity only on the reasoning part. On the other hand, more interpreters nowadays hold that Plato assigns some cognitive capacity(and desire)to every part of the soul and makes each one work like an agent. The interpretation I advance in this paper, however, does not belong to either of these groups. My main purpose is to point out the difficulties in specifying the subject of cognition within the divided soul, and suggest that Plato lays down a theoretical limit to the theory of the tripartite soul in the Republic. The argument proceeds through the elucidation of the three passages below, which have been discussed in relation to this issue. (1)IV 437D-438A : In this passage, Plato identifies the relationship between desire (e.g. thirst) and its 'object' (e.g. drink) with that of 'the bigger' and 'the smaller'. This reveals that the relation is internal and(a la Wittgenstein)grammatical. Then we should not judge on the basis of this passage, as some interpreters do, whether the appetitive part has a cognitive power or not. (2)X 602C-603A : The prevailing interpretation of this passage is that Plato here assigns the capacity of perceptual judgement to the irrational part of the soul. I don't adopt this interpretation, however, for the following reasons. First, such a thing as a stick in the water appears crooked even to the reasoning part(603E4-6). And secondly, the distinction between the reasoning part and the irrational one is derived from the contrast of their attitudes toward such an appearance or a verdict reached by measurement (603A1-7). Therefore, even though we can take their attitudes as a kind of 'judgement' (δοξαζειν) , the subject or perception or perceptual judgement is not to be identified either as the reasoning part or as the irrational part. (3)VII 523A-525A. Most interpreters hold that this passage shows that Plato admits a considerable autonomy of the senses(e.g. sense of sight)by assigning them the power of perceptual judgement. They take the recurrence of such a sentence like 'the sense of sight sees this or that, or reports this or that' as evidence for this interpretation. I do not, however, accept this view either. I list here some of the arguments against this view :(i)The senses are to play the role as a reporter or communicator to the soul, so they do not have the kind of autonomy that the parts of the soul have.(ii)The function of intellect(νοησι&b.sigmav;) is also described by such a sentence 'intellect sees this or that', so the construction of the sentences taking a verb of perception or communication as predicate does not necessarily imply the autonomy or independence of the senses from the soul ; intellect is an organ of the soul. (iii)A confusing report from the senses necessarily compels the soul to summon intellect and ask it what is the F. The senses alone, if acting independently of the soul, could not provide such necessity and compulsory force. I think it comes from the soul itself ; the soul already committed itself on the perceptual judgement by the senses, using its own confused conception of the F and the opposite-F in that judgement. I conclude from the above and the other evidence that, at least in the case of perception, the subject is the soul itself, neither a particular part of it nor the senses. This reveals a restriction Plato imposes on the explanatory power of the theory of the tripartite soul in respect of the problem of cognition, for he clarifies the nature of cognition(knowledge, intellect) in comparison with, or by contrast to, the function of perception in books VVII, where the theory of</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>