The number of reported cases for Japanese Penal Code offenses registered over 2.5 million in 1997, increasing every year thereafter, reaching to over 3.6 million (+49.8%) in 2002 and 2003. However, the number has decreased since 2004, to under 2.5 million (-35.0%) in 2009. The number of cleared cases fluctuated between 1.3 and 1.5 million and the number of cleared persons registered between 1 and 1.2 million, reaching 1 million in 2011. In this paper we call the silhouette of these increasing and decreasing numbers of reported cases and cleared cases and persons the "Mt.Fuji-line" (cf. Graph). The government reacted to the increase in crime, which reflected weakened security and safety in Japan. The most effective policy was to increase the number of police officers. It followed the model of New York City, which is remembered as Giuliani's success. He declared a "War on Crime" in order to increase the number of police officers and to revive New York's image from "Crime City" to "Safe Town." From the criminological perspective, which has experienced "Labeling Shock" and introduced the interactionalists' method, no one can believe the statement that the statistical data reflects weakened or broken security and safety. We learn of "dark figures" and have to adjust the data by self-reporting or victim research. We should use official crime reports as the indexes to represent activities of crime control agencies. The agencies, especially police, use this data as statistical evidence to show that juvenile delinquencies increased and grew more violent, and delinquents became younger. They legitimatized their policies under a series of campaigns: "Fall of the Safest Society," "Against Aum-sect and Terrorism," "For Crime Victims' Rights" etc., with such crime reports as evidence. In this paper, we assume that the rise and fall of crime, especially the increasing and decreasing numbers of reported cases, reflects changes of crime control policies. According to this assumption, we analyze the Mt. Fuji-line of criminal statistics from 1998 to 2008. I show the conclusion that increased crime and weakened security and safety functioned as evidence to justify the reinforcement of police power (increasing police officers and decreasing the population per police officer) and setting a new criminal justice shift against a lay judge system (reducing burden through a new priority system).