アリストテレスにおける決定論と様相の問題

Some scholars have pointed out that there are deterministic tendencies in Aristotle's philosophy This essay maintains that these tendencies stem from his notion of explanation based on logical necessity and his notion of possibility which is different from ours, especially in being realizable possibility In Metaphysics E3, Aristotle criticizes the deterministic argument, which insists that every fact is caused necessarily and has a fixed cause Aristotle's way out of this argument is hard to see, but at least it is obvious that he depends on the causal connection in respect of itself to differentiate accidental causes that bring about coincidence Aristotle's dependence on logical necessity based on conceptual identity of explanans and explanandum is already presupposed in the refutation, and constitutes the core of Aristotle's notion of explanation His repetition of necessary causal chains is a requisite step to show that there are some phenomena that are not described as having the causal connection in respect of itself Moreover, in Metaphysics H6, Aristotle discusses oneness of perceptual substances, and settles this problem by taking matter as potentiality, form as actuality He indicates nothing explains being one, considering the necessary connection based on logical necessity between the proximate matter and the substantial form which are combined with each other in the actual thing itself We can see that, from Aristotle's alleged priority of actuality over potentiality, his general notion of possibility has also a inclination to be explained from its realization at some future time (See Sarah Waterlow's formahzation) Aristotle's refutation of the Meganans in Metaphysics Θ represents this inclination very clearly, where he distinguishes being impossible from being possible in respect of being realizable at some future time without impossible consequences In De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle, while insisting on refuting determinists, states their argument repeatedly, so it is not easy to understand how he settles the problem about future contingency The reason why his process of thinking comes near to admitting an absurd deterministic conclusion (future tensed singular propositions are, if true in the future, then necessarily true) is his notion of possibility as being realizable at some time in the future But he maintains that by taking the realization at another time in the future into consideration, we can distinguish, of the two contradictory pairs (e g whether this cloak will be cut or not), the other disjunct's being possible from its being impossible Such a way to define possibility can be also recognized in Metaphysics Θ and De Caelo, where he makes a difference between falsity and impossibility In De Interpretation 9, however, he applies the same method to the realization of different possibilities at another time in the future, and refutes the deterministic argument