In Nicomachean Ethics VII 3 Aristotle asks in what way an uncontrolled person (an akrates) knows what he should (or should not) do when he acts against his knowledge. Aristotle's analysis of the uncontrolled person's knowledge is based on his doctrine of the practical syllogism. According to that doctrine, if an agent knows all of the premises of a practical syllogism, he will decide to act on them and (if not prevented) he will act on them. For example, if he knows that one should not taste anything that is X and he knows that this is X, he will decide not to taste it and (if not prevented from not tasting it) he will not taste it. On the traditional interpretation of 1147a31-b12 an uncontrolled person has knowledge of the universal premise, but because he is affected by passion, he fails properly to have knowledge of the particular premise. However, 1147b15-17 appears to be inconsistent with this interpretation, since Aristotle seems to say there that the condition of being uncontrolled occurs when knowledge of the particular premise, and not knowledge of the universal premise, is present in us (parouses). To remove this inconsistency many interpreters accept Stewart's proposal to emend 'parouses ginetai' at b16 to 'periginetai'. However, this proposal is not well grounded from a philological point of view. I think it is better to keep the text as it stands. The main reason the above inconsistency arises is that 'parouses' in b16 is interpreted as 'present in us'. However, it can also be interpreted as 'near to passion'. If so, then 1147b15-17 can be understood as follows: being uncontrolled occurs when knowledge of the particular premise, and not knowledge of the universal premise, is near to passion (i.e. affected by passion). If this interpretation of 1147b15-17 is right, then Aristotle attributes a cognitive failure to the uncontrolled person. The uncontrolled person does not recognize what he should (or should not) do on a particular occasion, because under the influence of passion, he fails properly to have knowledge of the particular premise of the relevant practical syllogism. So understood, Aristotle seems to defend Socrates' position on being uncontrolled. Socrates insists that knowledge is not dragged about by passion, and that being uncontrolled occurs because of a lack of knowledge. Aristotle concludes that in a sense this is correct. In the case of an uncontrolled person, knowledge proper, knowledge of the universal, is not affected by passion. A person is uncontrolled because, affected by passion, he does not properly have knowledge of the particular situation at hand.