Merchants Need to be both Honest and Flirtatious : A Case Study of Qat Markets in Yemen

<p>This article aims to clarify the relationship between economic subjects in qat (qa^^-t) markets in Sana'a, Republic of Yemen, from the perspective of asymmetric information. Qat, whose fresh leaves produce a stimulant effect, is consumed by both Yemeni men and women during afternoon gatherings, which function as social occasions. The distribution channels of qat are very effective in Yemen. It is harvested in the early morning, sold in the markets around noon, and consumed in the afternoon: all the processes are done within a single day, or strictly speaking, several hours. The government and private companies intervene little in the processes, and only one or two merchants are involved in them. The concept of asymmetric information, which was first discussed in the field of economics, has been applied to the study of bazaars, mainly investigated by researchers of anthropology and area studies. The bazaar merchants are the strong actors, monopolizing and concealing information, while the producers and purchasers are the weak actors, having less information. The latter two need to be clients of the former in order to overcome their disadvantage, and through that, merchants can monopolize the future demands of producers and purchasers. Therefore, client ties are thought to be beneficial for both the strong and weak actors in such a market. They have been regarded as firm, sustainable, and given. In Yemen, most areas cultivated with gat are actually tribal lands. Tribal people are known as conservative and autonomous, and do not want outsiders to come onto their lands. Qat merchants, who are mostly males in Sana'a, take advantage of their blood relationships when starting their business: their relatives may take them to a qat market and teach them how to get in; or they may go to a qat market in their hometowns, where their relatives sell it. The relationships, however, are not so firm, as the kinds of qat and ways of getting it can change depending on their own tastes and those of their purchasers, without depending on their relatives. After a while, merchants may get to know the producers from whom they purchase their qat, allowing them to get it more quickly and cheaply. They can even wait to delay their payments if they do not have enough money to get the qat at first (although generally speaking, qat merchants must pay in cash) . That makes them clients of the producer. Qat producers want to build firm client ties with as many merchants as possible: the more clients they have, the steadier their income. But being a client of a qat producer is rather risky for a qat merchant, as the quality of qat changes easily. To maintain the quality of the qat they purchase, merchants need to be a chance customer or an acquaintance of as many qat producers as possible, so as not to keep firm client ties. When it comes to selling qat, meanwhile, merchants want to build firm client ties with as many purchasers as possible: the more clients they have, the steadier their income. The same is true of purchasers as well. If they want to maintain the quality of the qat they buy, it is better for them not be clients of a particular qat merchant, but rather to be a chance customer or an acquaintance of as many qat merchants as possible. Information about the quality of qat is more important for the economic subjects than that about the market, which qat producers and purchasers can easily get. The relative level of quality-related information is as follows: producers > merchants > purchasers. That means that merchants are not the only strong ones in the qat market. Because of the uncertainty of qat quality, the weak actors (i.e., the merchants and purchasers) tend to act flirtatiously toward the strong actors (i.e., the producers and merchants) in order to become chance costumers or acquaintances. That leads the strong actors also to act flirtatiously, as they would like to build</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>