On some cognitive transformations for the prisoner's dilemma

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  • 囚人ジレンマの認知的変形について
  • シュウジン ジレンマ ノ ニンチテキ ヘンケイ ニ ツイテ

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Abstract

The possibility of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma and its versions has been argued in game theory and the related fields where game theory is applied. Pareto optimality cannot be achieved, at least in the case of the one-shot games because mutually defective behavior alone is both the best response and dominant in the game. This study examines the cognitive transformations of two-player bi-matrix games. Even in the original game that has no conflict, by focusing on the differences in the players' payoffs, a mutually beneficial situation can be transformed into a conflicting situation as in prisoner's dilemma. In this study, this cognitively derived new game is called pseudo prisoner's dilemma or fragile reciprocity. Further, conversely, cognitive transformations using a common parameter, linked strategies, and a market mechanism similar to that of Cournot duopoly are proposed to explain the possibility of cooperative behavior in pseudo prisoner's dilemma.

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