The issue of navigation on the Yangtze during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War

DOI

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 日中戦争下における揚子江航行問題
  • 日本の華中支配と対英米協調路線の蹉跌
  • Setbacks in the Japanese occupation of central China and its policy of cooperation with Britain and the U.S.

Abstract

This article discusses the diplomatic issues which arose after Japan attempted to monopolize navigation on the Yangtze River during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War, by focusing on the two inconsistencies in Japanese occupation policy of avoiding a declaration of war and seeking cooperation with Britain and the U.S. under the concept of a the New Order in Asia.<br> While Britain and the U.S. demanded the resumption of free navigation as soon as the fighting on the Yangtze stopped, Japan refused to reopen the River citing security issues, even after the fall of Hankow. Criticizing such an attitude, Britain and the U.S. pointed out that since only Japanese commercial ships were allowed to navigate the Yangtze freely, Japan was engaging in de facto occupation of the region. In response, Japan refused to reopen the waterway on the premise that they were indeed pursuing such a policy.<br> The author then turns to Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro who favored opening the Yangtze as a gesture of cooperation towards toward Britain and the U.S. and his advocacy of the New Order in Asia. Arita planned to open the Yangtze and rebuild friendly relations with Britain and the U.S. on the strength of domestic support for his tough attitude; however, due to stagnation in the implementation of the occupation policy, the expected date of the opening, suggested by the Koain 興亜院 planning agency, was postponed. The article also covers the local situation which presented more difficulties in opening the Yangtze, from the viewpoints of monetary currency, navigation and commercial conditions.<br> Faced with U.S. threats to abrogate the Japan-U.S. commerce and navigation treaty, Japan finally agreed to partly open the Yangtze, based on a strategy to influence the U.S. directly and indirectly in setting up a modus vivendi, but the U.S. and Britain did not respond as Japan hoped, while at the same time actual preparations to open the river bogged down, preventing Japan from keeping its verbal promise. This whole incident shows not only Japan’s failure in diplomatic cooperation and implementing its occupation policy, but also the difficulties faced by the Wang Chingwei 汪精衛 Government to develop its economic foundation.

Journal

  • SHIGAKU ZASSHI

    SHIGAKU ZASSHI 127 (3), 1-36, 2018

    The Historical Society of Japan

Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390001288128847872
  • NII Article ID
    130007616535
  • DOI
    10.24471/shigaku.127.3_1
  • ISSN
    24242616
    00182478
  • Text Lang
    ja
  • Data Source
    • JaLC
    • CiNii Articles
  • Abstract License Flag
    Disallowed

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