Immiserizing Income Transfers Embodied in Incentives Mechanisms for Global Environmental Protection
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- Shibata Hirofumi
- Prof. emeritus, Osaka University
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- Ihori Toshihiro
- University of Tokyo
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 経済的環境制御手段と万国窮乏化
- ケイザイテキ カンキョウ セイギョ シュダン ト バンコク キュウボウカ
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Abstract
<p>The currently widely used environmentai controlling measures that rely on economic incentives, such as emissions trading, joint implementation, and clean implementation programs, commonly stimulate de facto income transfers from the developed to the developing countries. By incorporating the optimal abatement behavior of the rich and the corner solution of the poor, we shall show that an increase in income of the environmentally less-concerned poor and a reduction in income of the environmentally more-concerned rich may not improve welfare of the poor. Reallocation of global income reduces the aggregate expenditure on abatement and thereby reduces the global environmental quaiity, which in turn reduces the welfare of all nations, including the poor, particularly when the number of the poor is large, and abatement technologies of the developed are more efficient than those of the developing countries.</p>
Journal
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- Review of Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
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Review of Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 1 (1), 15-23, 2008-01-25
The Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
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Keywords
Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390005822567124480
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- NII Article ID
- 130007993771
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- NII Book ID
- AA12295687
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- ISSN
- 21882495
- 18823742
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- NDL BIB ID
- 9658144
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed