<Articles>The Influence of the Security Crisis on the Korean Peninsula on the Okinawa Reversion Negotiations, Focusing on the Deployment of B52 Bombers in Okinawa

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  • <論説>沖縄返還交渉と朝鮮半島情勢 : B52沖縄配備に着目して
  • The Influence of the Security Crisis on the Korean Peninsula on the Okinawa Reversion Negotiations, Focusing on the Deployment of B52 Bombers in Okinawa
  • 沖縄返還交渉と朝鮮半島情勢 : B52沖縄配備に着目して
  • オキナワ ヘンカン コウショウ ト チョウセン ハントウ ジョウセイ : B52 オキナワ ハイビ ニ チャクモク シテ

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Abstract

The B52 is a large strategic bomber that can be equipped with nuclear weapons. The U.S. Air Force used B52s for carpet-bombing in Vietnam during the Vietnam War. They deployed B52s in Okinawa in February 1968. However, the initial purpose of the deployment of the B52s in Okinawa was to prepare for a potential crisis on the Korean Peninsula The deployment of B52s and the campaign for their removal from Okinawa had an effect on the U.S.-Japan negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa. The purpose of this study is to reveal the correlation between the Okinawa reversion negotiations and the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In 1965, the U.S. staged a full-scale military intervention in Vietnam. The Republic of Korea (ROK), an ally of the U.S. decided to send troops to Vietnam in 1965. This became a factor behind the annual increase in provocations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) after the latter half of 1966. On the other hand, in Okinawa and Japan, calls for reversion of Okinawa and the antiwar movement rose, and negotiations on reversion began between the Japanese and the U.S. governments. Provocations from the DPRK reached a climax in the beginning of 1968. The Blue House Raid and the Pueblo incident occurred in succession. This security crisis on the Korean Peninsula greatly shocked both the ROK and the U.S. governments to the extent that the U.S. deployed B52s in Okinawa in readiness for a further crisis on the Korean Peninsula. And because of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the U.S. began to fly B52s from Okinawa to attack Vietnam, so a large antiwar movement calling for the removal of the planes arose in Okinawa and Japan. The first election for the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Government in Okinawa was scheduled for November 1968, so the Japanese government, some U.S. government officials and the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) feared that the existence of the B52s would have a negative influence upon the election. They tried to remove the B52s before the election, but the U.S. military authorities were tenaciously opposed to their removal, emphasizing the situation in Vietnam and the Korean Peninsula. In the ROK, fears for the safety of the ROK intensified after the security crisis, and some South Koreans advocated that the U.S. should relocate U.S. bases in Okinawa to Cheju. The U.S. government refused this move because the cost would have been prohibitive. On the other hand, the Japanese government began to recognize that the security of the ROK was indispensable to that of Japan. As a result of the November Chief Executive election, a reformist administration was formed in Okinawa. A week after the election, a B52 bomber crashed there, and large removal campaign, which included the possibility of a general strike, occurred. Although the general strike was avoided, both the U.S. and Japanese governments were anxious about the situation in Okinawa so they quickened negotiations on Okinawan reversion. On the other hand, the ROK was apprehensive that Japan would insist that the U.S. bases be removed from Okinawa when it was returned to Japan. Therefore, the ROK strongly insisted that the U.S. and Japanese governments not weaken Okinawa's military facilities. In April 1969, the DPRK air force shot down a U.S. Navy Lockheed EC121, so the ROK's fear about security increased. The U.S. and Japanese governments also recognized the importance of the bases in Okinawa anew, but they were concerned that the ROK's approach would have the opposite effect on Japanese and Okinawan public opinion. As a result, the two governments guaranteed the ROK in secret that Okinawa's base facilities would not be weakened because of the reversion. In Okinawa, after the avoidance of general strike, the anti-B52 movement remained quiet for several months. However, in July 1969, an U.S. media reported that poison gas was stored in several places on Okinawa. In addition, as the B52s were not removed becau

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  • 史林

    史林 97 (3), 416-486, 2014-05-31

    THE SHIGAKU KENKYUKAI (The Society of Historical Research), Kyoto University

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