The two-level game : the interrelationship of international bargaining and domestic decision processes
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
-
- 2レベルゲームについて : 国際間交渉と国内の意思決定過程の相互関係
- 2レベル ゲーム ニツイテ : コクサイカン コウショウ ト コクナイ ノ イシ ケッテイ カテイ ノ ソウゴ カンケイ
Search this article
Description
I examine the two-level games model with a negotiation process for the selection of representatives. Putnam (1988) has proposed two-level games and has advanced hypotheses on international bargaining with domestic constrains. Iida (1993/1996) and Tarar (2001) have examined the hypotheses using a game-theoretic model. They stressed that asymmetric information plays an important role in the hypotheses. Even if complete information is available, our model leads the conditions of the hypotheses.
Journal
-
- 經濟學論叢
-
經濟學論叢 63 (3), 329-356, 2011-12-20
The Doshisha Economic Association
- Tweet
Keywords
Details 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1390009224914155904
-
- NII Article ID
- 110009822731
-
- NII Book ID
- AN00070477
-
- NDL BIB ID
- 023455031
-
- ISSN
- 03873021
-
- Text Lang
- ja
-
- Article Type
- departmental bulletin paper
-
- Data Source
-
- JaLC
- IRDB
- NDL Search
- CiNii Articles
-
- Abstract License Flag
- Allowed