Various Anonymity Properties in Diffusion Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games
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- ANDO Ryoto
- Kyushu University
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- KIMURA Kei
- Kyushu University
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- TODO Taiki
- Kyushu University
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- YOKOO Makoto
- Kyushu University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 情報伝播を伴う施設配置ゲームにおける様々な匿名性
Description
<p>Diffusion mechanism design is a new research paradigm in the literature of mechanism design, which aims to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues as possible to participate in a mechanism. An existing work on diffusion mechanism design for facility location games showed that there is no mechanism that satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and full anonymity, as well as proposed two naive mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency by ignoring the full anonymity property. In this paper we aim to reveal to what extent strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms could be anonymous. We first define a class of anonymity properties by introducing a concept of partitions of the set of participating agents, and clarify a sufficient condition on partitions that guarantees the existence of mechanisms satisfying an anonymity property, as well as strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency.</p>
Journal
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- Proceedings of the Annual Conference of JSAI
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Proceedings of the Annual Conference of JSAI JSAI2024 (0), 3Xin250-3Xin250, 2024
The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390018971042397312
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- ISSN
- 27587347
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed