ON SIMPLE GAMES WITH PERMISSION OF VOTERS

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  • 投票者の許容範囲とシンプルゲームのコアの関係について
  • トウヒョウシャ ノ キョヨウ ハンイ ト シンプルゲーム ノ コア ノ カンケイ ニ ツイテ

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In this paper, treating flexible voters in voting situations, we examine the influences of the flexibility of voters on coalition formation and final decision making in the situations of group decision making. We employ new models of voting situations, called permission games and postulated games to deal with the voting situations with flexible voters, and show 1) that simple games can be seen as specialization of permission games, 2) that there can be an opinion that is permissible for all decision makers, even if no decision cannot be made by voting, 3) that coalitions with different opinions can agree on the same opinion through enough informaion exchange, and 4) that the core of a simple game can be interpreted as the set of all alternatives that do not cause voters any regret in terms of their flexibility.

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