系列店リベートの価格効果と厚生効果

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  • The Price and Welfare Effects of Rebates Offered to Integrated Retail Outlets
  • ケイレツテン リベート ノ カカク コウカ ト コウセイ コウカ

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This paper presents a model of rebate payments from manufacturers to their affiliated retailers as an exclusive business practice. In Japanese home appliance industries, major manufacturers offer rebates on their products and organize the integrated retail outlets that carry by contract mainly one company's products. They also offer rebates to mass merchandisers who carry many companies' products to motivate the dealers to adopt policies of maintaining a narrow profit margin and large sales volume. Each mechanism of these rebate systems brings about different effects on price and welfare.<br>We show that retail price is lower when transactions between manufacturers and retailers are accomplished in a spot market than it is when each downstreamer establishes an exclusive contractual relationship with a particular upstreamer by giving and receiving rebates. While the retail price level is maintained regardless of the rate of rebate payments from the manufacturer to the retail outlets, individual profits for both cooperative firms can be greater than those under market transactions by the payment rate control. On the other hand, rebate payments from manufacturers to mass merchandiser lower the retail price and increase the individual profits for both parties.<br>Each of the rebate systems therefore serves to increase the total profits for retailers and manufacturers. Unlike rebate payments to the mass merchandisers, rebate payments to the retail outlets decrease social surplus since the loss of consumer surplus exceeds the gain of the total profits for the vertically cooperative firms, however.

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