ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL MYOPIA

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This paper examines whether corporate governance mechanisms in Taiwan listing companies could reduce incentives for managers to engage in myopic research and development (R & D) investment behavior. Our results show that managers with higher ownerships are less likely to cut R & D investment to meet short-term earnings goals. The probability of reducing R & D investment for earnings-increasing firms is low when CEOs chair the board of directors or CEO compensation-performance sensitivity is high. And, the institutional investors for firms facing earnings marginally decreases could play a monitoring role in reducing incentives to manage earnings with cuts in R & D.

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Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390282679460462336
  • NII Article ID
    130004301731
  • DOI
    10.5057/kei.7.9
  • ISSN
    18845231
    13451928
  • Text Lang
    en
  • Data Source
    • JaLC
    • Crossref
    • CiNii Articles
  • Abstract License Flag
    Disallowed

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