書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- General trust and the dilemma of variable interdependency
- イッパンテキ シンライ ト イゾンド センタクガタ シュウジン ノ ジレンマ
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This study examined the development of trusting relationships as investments in relation-specific assets. A new experimental game called "the dilemma of variable interdependency" was created based on iterated prisoner's dilemma game, in which subjects faced a choice of increasing or decreasing the level of dependency in addition to the usual choice between cooperation and defection. Results of the experiment confirmed the hypothesis that high-trusters (those who have a strong belief in human benevolence) would take a risk of making themselves vulnerable to exploitative behavior of the partner more strongly than low-trusters. This resulted in formation of mutually highly dependent relationships among high-trusters. It was further demonstrated that the subjects' levels of trust affect their cooperation levels when they were given an option to choose the level of dependence but not in the ordinary two-person, iterated PD.
収録刊行物
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- 社会心理学研究
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社会心理学研究 12 (3), 212-221, 1997
日本社会心理学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282679466896512
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- NII論文ID
- 110002785305
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- NII書誌ID
- AN10049127
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- ISSN
- 21891338
- 09161503
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- NDL書誌ID
- 4167698
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- 本文言語コード
- ja
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可