書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- The robustness of Pareto-optimality in group decision-making : Do people pursue distributive justice over social efficiency? (II)
- 合議におけるパレート原理の頑健性:「寡きを患えず、均しからざるを患う」?(2)
- ゴウギ ニ オケル パレート ゲンリ ノ ガンケンセイ スクナキ オ ウレエズ ナラシカラザル オ ワズラウ 2
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Tamura & Kameda (2004) showed that, when people evaluated the desirability of various resource allocations, their preference for an "allocation that was unfair but provided a Pareto-improvement" over other "fair" allocations was enhanced via group discussion. In their study, participants served as arbitrators who were asked to solve disputes over resource-allocation. This study was a conceptual replication of Tamura & Kameda (2004) to determine whether the prevalence of the Pareto-principle can be observed in a group situation, where interested parties discussed resource-allocation. In each experimental session, two college students worked on an anagram task individually, and then discussed how to allocate a "pair-reward" between them (n=40). The pairs were presented with three reward allocation schemes : plans based on equality, equity, or a plan that was unfair (i.e., paying more to the less productive member) but provided a Pareto-improvement over the other two plans. In line with Tamura & Kameda (2004), the results confirmed that participants' preference for the unfair but Pareto-improving allocation was enhanced substantively via group discussion.
収録刊行物
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- 社会心理学研究
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社会心理学研究 21 (3), 233-240, 2006
日本社会心理学会
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キーワード
詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282679468071040
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- NII論文ID
- 110004071515
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- NII書誌ID
- AN10049127
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- ISSN
- 21891338
- 09161503
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- NDL書誌ID
- 7807225
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- 本文言語コード
- ja
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可