The effect of the generalized tit-for-tat strategy on solving second-order free-rider problems : A computer simulation study.
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- TERAI Shigeru
- Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University
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- YAMAGISHI Toshio
- Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University
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- WATABE Motoki
- Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies, Kyoto University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 2次的ジレンマ問題に対する集団応報戦略の効果 : コンピュータ・シミュレーション研究
- 2ジテキ ジレンマ モンダイ ニ タイスル シュウダン オウホウ センリャク ノ コウカ コンピュータ シミュレーション ケンキュウ
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Abstract
Using computer simulations, this study examined whether mutual cooperation can occur in social dilemmas characterized by the absence of a central authority. In the absence of a central authority, provision of a sanctioning system that administers selective incentives-a well referred solution to social dilemmas-constitutes a second-order social dilemma. The purpose of this study was to examine whether the generalized tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is an extended version of tit-for-tat that is applied in n-person games, can help solve the second-order social dilemma. The results of computer simulations indicated that the second-order social dilemma could be resolved when group members adopt the Generalized TFT. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the Generalized TFT strategy could survive and prosper in a population originally dominated by "probabilistic actors."
Journal
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- Japanese Journal of Social Psychology
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Japanese Journal of Social Psychology 19 (2), 94-103, 2003
The Japanese Society of Social Psychology
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282679468556288
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- NII Article ID
- 110002785384
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- NII Book ID
- AN10049127
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- ISSN
- 21891338
- 09161503
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- NDL BIB ID
- 6790103
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed