Adaptive foundations of in-group favoring behavior : An examination using evolutionary simulation
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- ONODA Ryoichi
- Hokkaido University
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- TAKAHASHI Nobuyuki
- Hokkaido University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 内集団ひいき行動の適応的基盤 : 進化シミュレーションを用いた検討
- ナイ シュウダンヒイキ コウドウ ノ テキオウテキ キバン : シンカ シミュレーション オ モチイタ ケントウ
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Abstract
When people behave more cooperatively toward in-group members than to out-group members, we call it "in-group favoring behavior." However, previous studies have not yet provided a satisfactory explanation for why in-group favoritism can be adaptive. In the current study, we conducted a series of simulations to explain such behaviors from an evolutionary perspective. We used the giving game and constructed a society composed of two groups, A and B. In the game, every player was given a fixed amount of resources and decided how much and to whom he gave. The results showed that the in-group favoring strategy is adaptive only when it has a strict criterion for recipients (not giving any resources to players who had helped other players who did not adopt the in-group favoring strategy). Furthermore, they showed that there were other strategies which have a strict criterion for recipients that could be adaptive as well. These findings suggest that strategies which form a circle of exchange only among themselves by excluding other strategies can be adaptive.
Journal
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- Japanese Journal of Social Psychology
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Japanese Journal of Social Psychology 29 (2), 65-74, 2013
The Japanese Society of Social Psychology
