書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- Adaptive foundations of in-group favoring behavior : An examination using evolutionary simulation
- ナイ シュウダンヒイキ コウドウ ノ テキオウテキ キバン : シンカ シミュレーション オ モチイタ ケントウ
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抄録
When people behave more cooperatively toward in-group members than to out-group members, we call it "in-group favoring behavior." However, previous studies have not yet provided a satisfactory explanation for why in-group favoritism can be adaptive. In the current study, we conducted a series of simulations to explain such behaviors from an evolutionary perspective. We used the giving game and constructed a society composed of two groups, A and B. In the game, every player was given a fixed amount of resources and decided how much and to whom he gave. The results showed that the in-group favoring strategy is adaptive only when it has a strict criterion for recipients (not giving any resources to players who had helped other players who did not adopt the in-group favoring strategy). Furthermore, they showed that there were other strategies which have a strict criterion for recipients that could be adaptive as well. These findings suggest that strategies which form a circle of exchange only among themselves by excluding other strategies can be adaptive.
収録刊行物
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- 社会心理学研究
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社会心理学研究 29 (2), 65-74, 2013
日本社会心理学会
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キーワード
詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282679468709632
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- NII論文ID
- 110009687143
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- NII書誌ID
- AN10049127
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- ISSN
- 21891338
- 09161503
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- NDL書誌ID
- 025085471
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- 本文言語コード
- ja
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可