Game Theory for Computer Scientists — Mechanism Design (Basic) —

  • YOKOO Makoto
    Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University
  • IWASAKI Atsushi
    Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University
  • SAKURAI Yuko
    Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University
  • OKAMOTO Yoshio
    Graduate School of Informatics and Engineering, University of Electro-communications

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 『計算機科学者のためのゲーム理論入門』シリーズ第3回 メカニズムデザイン(基礎編)

Search this article

Abstract

This tutorial describes an overview of mechanism design theory, which investigates a rule or a protocol for multiple agents to make a social decision. The theory models the decision problem as a games of incomplete information, where each player cannot directly observe her opponents' types. Under the assumption that each agent behaves so as to maximize her individual utility, mechanism design theory analyzes how a player chooses her action under a mechanism, while designs a mechanism to achieve a socially desirable outcome or a goal of the designer. This tutorial first briefly explains games of incomplete information and the concept of mechanism design. Then, as a typical example, we focus on auctions that sell a single item and explain several theoretical results on mechanism design theory.

Journal

  • Computer Software

    Computer Software 29 (4), 4_15-4_31, 2012

    Japan Society for Software Science and Technology

Citations (1)*help

See more

References(11)*help

See more

Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390282679714821504
  • NII Article ID
    10031077886
  • NII Book ID
    AN10075819
  • DOI
    10.11309/jssst.29.4_15
  • ISSN
    02896540
  • Text Lang
    ja
  • Data Source
    • JaLC
    • CiNii Articles
  • Abstract License Flag
    Disallowed

Report a problem

Back to top