Game Theory for Computer Scientists — Mechanism Design (Basic) —
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- YOKOO Makoto
- Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University
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- IWASAKI Atsushi
- Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University
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- SAKURAI Yuko
- Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University
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- OKAMOTO Yoshio
- Graduate School of Informatics and Engineering, University of Electro-communications
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 『計算機科学者のためのゲーム理論入門』シリーズ第3回 メカニズムデザイン(基礎編)
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Abstract
This tutorial describes an overview of mechanism design theory, which investigates a rule or a protocol for multiple agents to make a social decision. The theory models the decision problem as a games of incomplete information, where each player cannot directly observe her opponents' types. Under the assumption that each agent behaves so as to maximize her individual utility, mechanism design theory analyzes how a player chooses her action under a mechanism, while designs a mechanism to achieve a socially desirable outcome or a goal of the designer. This tutorial first briefly explains games of incomplete information and the concept of mechanism design. Then, as a typical example, we focus on auctions that sell a single item and explain several theoretical results on mechanism design theory.
Journal
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- Computer Software
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Computer Software 29 (4), 4_15-4_31, 2012
Japan Society for Software Science and Technology
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282679714821504
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- NII Article ID
- 10031077886
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- NII Book ID
- AN10075819
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- ISSN
- 02896540
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- CiNii Articles
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed