書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- Effect of consensus on punitive behavior
- タシャ イケン ガ バツ コウドウ ニ アタエル エイキョウ
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抄録
In addition to the cost of punishment, the fear that others would evaluate punishers negatively can be a major obstacle for resolving the second-order social dilemma or failure of providing sanctions useful for solving a social dilemma problem. In an experiment with 81 participants, we tested whether providing information that other participants were in favor of punishing non-cooperators in a social dilemma situation would enhance cooperation in the second-order dilemma (i.e., punishment of non-cooperators). Participants received feedback of three bogus “participants” choices in a four-person social dilemma, in which one bogus participant defected and two others cooperated, and then received a chance to punish the sole non-cooperator. The hypothesis was supported among those who were motivated to punish the non-cooperator. They punished the non-cooperator when they were informed that the other participants also wanted to punish the non-cooperator. The feedback information that the other participants wanted to punish the non-cooperator induced the participants who were not motivated to punish the non-cooperator to punish less.
収録刊行物
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- 心理学研究
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心理学研究 83 (6), 582-588, 2013
公益社団法人 日本心理学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282680055616768
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- NII論文ID
- 130003374302
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00123620
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- COI
- 1:STN:280:DC%2BC3srgtlartw%3D%3D
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- ISSN
- 18841082
- 00215236
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- NDL書誌ID
- 024272486
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- PubMed
- 23534266
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- 本文言語コード
- ja
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- Crossref
- PubMed
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可